“Not even we can see your bags.”
The machinery behind that sentence, and the places where we say plainly what remains.
Why you don't have to take our word for it
The balance-reading code doesn't run on our servers. It runs in a sealed enclave, a virtual machine whose memory is encrypted by the physical chip (AMD SEV / Intel TDX), on Google Cloud's Confidential Space. Not even the machine's operator, us, can read its memory or change its code while it runs.
And you don't have to believe that description either. The enclave holds a certificate, signed by Google, that names the exact code image it runs. Your browser checks that certificate against the fingerprint we publish publicly before sending anything. If the image ever changed (added logging, exported balances), the old fingerprint would stop matching and every client would refuse to talk to it.
The image is built from public source. If you want, you can read exactly what the enclave does with your data, because the answer is “compute the tier, sign it, forget the addresses.”
What different parties can see
The honest tradeoffs
RPC PROVIDERS SEE QUERIED ADDRESSES
To read a balance, the enclave must ask a blockchain node, and the address is in the question by definition. Those providers could, in principle, correlate queries. Mitigations (provider rotation, and longer-term self-hosted nodes) are on the roadmap; today this is the main residual leak, and we'd rather name it than bury it.
PRICES COME FROM MARKET APIs
Valuations come from public price APIs. There is no token allowlist: everything you hold gets priced, and anything unpriceable is skipped, never guessed. Every value is overflow-checked, dollar-pegged assets are capped at $1.00, and the final total is bucketed into a band so small price errors rarely move your tier.
PSEUDONYMS ARE ONE-WAY, NOT MAGIC
Wallet pseudonyms are keyed hashes: nobody can reverse them into an address. In production they are keyed with a secret only the enclave holds, so even a leaked database can't be matched against a list of guessed addresses. The registry is treated as write-only and never published.
A TEE IS NOT SORCERY
Attestation makes the enclave's behavior checkable, not physically impossible to subvert. Google sits in the trust base. The difference is that its claims are verified, not assumed. We publish this so you can decide what it's worth to you.
FAILS CLOSED, NOT OPEN
Every check in the chain (attestation, signature, nonce, expiry, policy version, image fingerprint) must pass or the whole verification is rejected. There are no “accepted with warnings” paths. If the enclave can't prove itself, your browser stops. If the result can't prove itself, the server stops. Nobody can talk either side into a lower standard.